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Benedict Spinoza is arguably the first important political philosopher to endorse 
democracy as the best government.  He does so primarily on the basis of the 
claim that it is the most natural regime.  However, there are features of 
Spinoza’s argument that complicate efforts to interpret his understanding of the 
naturalness of democracy, especially (i) the tension between his claims about the 
naturalness and rationality of democracy; and (ii) uncertainty about Spinoza’s 
attitude toward the natural end or goal of political life.  This study argues that 
Spinoza’s claims about the naturalness of democracy are only fully intelligible in 
light of the connection between his metaphysics, on the one hand, and his 
conception of political right, on the other.  We conclude that Spinoza believed 
the naturalness, and hence superiority, of democracy rests on its capacity to 
promote a formative purpose that includes both the perfection of social 
construction in the state and the intellectual and moral development of 
individuals. 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Benedict Spinoza’s political philosophy is his defense of 
democracy as the best form of government.  Indeed, as one commentator observed with only 
slight exaggeration, Spinoza is arguably “the first democrat in the history of philosophy” (Feuer 
1980: 139).   Spinoza bases the superiority of democracy primarily on the claim that democracy 
is the most natural regime.  It is most natural in the sense that democracy “approaches most 
closely to the freedom nature bestows on every person.”1  It is also the most rational regime in 
the sense that a large collectivity of individuals is supposedly less subject to irrational and 
destructive passions than a monarch or aristocratic elite.2
However, there are features of Spinoza’s argument that complicate efforts to interpret the 
meaning of his endorsement of democracy.  First, as several commentators have noted (Smith 
1997: 121-22; Smith 2003: 132-33; Mara 1982: 142; Rosen 1987: 467), despite his claims about 
the rationality of democracy, Spinoza’s writings are replete with pessimistic expressions about 
the capacity of the “multitude” to act rationally (TP 1.5, 2.18; TTP 16.3).
  For Spinoza, it is the naturalness and 
inherent rationality of democracy that thus place it at the peak of political possibilities. 
3
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Spinoza’s unflattering account of human beings in a state of nature, in which all individuals are 
“by nature enemies” (TP 2.14), indicates that there is a tension between the naturalness of an 
institution and its capacity to provide adequately for human needs (McShea 1968: 82; Battisti 
1977: 631-2).  As Spinoza presents the natural condition it is, among all the possibilities for 
human life, arguably the least characterized by reason.   
Finally, there is considerable debate about how Spinoza’s account of democracy relates to the 
broader question of his attitude toward political life in general. On the one hand, many 
commentators maintain that Spinoza is essentially a liberal individualist for whom the aim of 
political life is the rather low Hobbesian goal of providing for basic physical needs, primarily self-
preservation (Gildin 1973: 385; Geismann 1991; DenUyl 1983: 166-67; Mara 1982: 135-36; 
Curley 1996: 331).   According to this minimalist interpretation, Spinoza viewed any potential 
higher end for human development as largely independent of political life, the intellectual 
purview of philosophic individuals rather than mass political society (Strauss 1965: 218-20; 
DenUyl 2008: 12, 16).  Peace and security are the proper goals of government, and democracy 
simply supplies these better than any other political arrangement.   
On the other side of the interpretive divide, the republican reading of Spinoza’s political theory 
emphasizes the perfectionist character of his vision of political life as an activity that gives 
ontological priority to the community over the individual by positing a substantive telos or end 
such as the promotion of moral and intellectual virtue, rather than simply peace (Del Lucchese 
2009: 342; Rosenthal 2001: 335; Smith 2003: 144; Smith 2005: 14-17; Kossman 2000: 81; Israel 
2004: 26).  The meaning of Spinoza’s claim about democracy thus obviously depends on 
whether it is Spinoza’s best regime because it most reliably provides for the liberal concern for 
security of rights, or because it contributes most fully to the classical republican inspired vision 
of the moral development of individuals, and promotion of civic virtue. 
This study addresses these issues by reexamining Spinoza’s claims about the naturalness of 
democracy. It will be shown that his argument is only fully intelligible in light of his conception 
of the broader aim of political life.  This broader aim of political life is, however, illuminated not 
only in his political writings, but also crucially in his metaphysical works. Despite Spinoza’s 
celebrated attack on the political naiveté of speculative philosophers, we will argue that 
Spinoza’s understanding of the naturalness of democracy depends on metaphysical assumptions 
embedded in his philosophical accounts of nature and substance. While Balibar (1998), 
Matheron (1969), Deleuze (1990) and Negri (1991) have previously demonstrated the 
importance of Spinoza’s metaphysics for providing a general understanding of his politics, the 
present study focuses on the crucial but often overlooked connection Spinoza establishes 
between democracy and the philosophical conception of substance central to his metaphysics.  
The naturalness of democracy, then, rests on its capacity to both establish peace and to 
translate into political and social terms certain formative metaphysical principles. 
Spinoza’s account of the formative purpose of democracy has two fundamental features.  First, 
democracy is a principle of social construction that he contrasts with the notions of sovereignty 
and contractualism then regnant in early-modern political philosophy.  For Spinoza, democracy 
is more than just a system of government.  Rather the construction of social reality per se is a 
fundamentally democratic phenomenon, which Spinoza describes in terms of a regime’s 
capacity to form “one mind” from the psychological raw material of self-interested individuals.  
His argument essentially reduces every political arrangement into categories of more or less 
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perfect democracies.  Thus, democracy is the practical culmination of the philosophical principle 
of substance.  In other words, democracy is the prime socio-political matter out of which all 
other conceivable arrangements are modifications. 
The second fundamental feature of Spinoza’s account of democracy is the connection he draws 
between the formative purpose of democracy, on the one hand, and the proper aim of political 
life, on the other.  According to Spinoza, democracy is the best form of government because it 
alone among regimes makes the promotion of intellectual and moral development one of the 
conscious aims of political association.  Thus, the superiority of democracy lies in part in its 
capacity to promote Spinoza’s vision of human excellence outlined in his metaphysical work the 
Ethics.  Although at first blush metaphysics appears distant from the theoretical concerns raised 
by democracy, we will demonstrate that Spinoza’s ideas of freedom, virtue, and scientific 
knowledge are in fact deeply embedded in his argument for the naturalness of democracy.  
Spinoza’s conception of democracy thus eludes strict categorization as liberal or republican.  It is 
in the perfectionist mold; however, it is a perfectionism that has roots in the premises of liberal 
individualism as Spinoza illuminated a complex causal relation between the possibility of human 
perfection through intellectual development, on the one hand, and the perfection of the 
political regime embodied in the democratic “free state,” on the other. 
The argument in this study develops in three main stages.  First, we will examine Spinoza’s 
claims about the naturalness and rationality of democracy paying particular attention to the 
tension between these two aspects of Spinoza’s argument for democracy.  We will then 
consider Spinoza’s reevaluation of the concept of sovereignty in light of his understanding of the 
connection between democracy and his metaphysical account of substance.  We will conclude 
by examining Spinoza’s presentation of the formative purpose of democracy, and its role in the 
promotion of human happiness. 
Spinoza’s Conception of Nature 
The argument that democracy is the most natural form of government is central to Spinoza’s 
claim for its superiority.  But how exactly is democracy natural and why is what is most natural 
superior in terms of political arrangements?  In order to address these questions, we need to 
consider how the two distinct accounts of nature presented in Spinoza’s political theory, on the 
one hand, and in his metaphysics, on the other, relate to his idea of democracy. 
For our purposes, the key treatment of nature in Spinoza’s political writings is his seminal 
account of the state of nature in chapter 16 of the Theologico-Political Treatise for it is here he 
argues that while the foundations of every state derive from “the natural right which everyone 
possesses,” it is democracy that most closely approaches the “freedom nature bestows on every 
person” (TTP 16.1, 11). By nature, “each individual thing has sovereign right to do everything it 
can do,” and thus natural right is simply “the rules determining the nature of each individual 
thing” (TTP 16.2).  These rules are not moral or ethical, but rather the innate characteristics of 
species or natural kinds.  As Spinoza explains: “fish are determined by nature to swim and big 
fish eat little ones” (TTP 16.2).  The natural root of the political equality associated with 
democracy is clearly visible in the “supreme law of nature,” which requires nothing more than 
that “each thing strives to persist in its own state so far as it can” (TTP 16.2).  This morally 
blameless natural preservationist striving or “conatus” is possessed by every creature and is 
subject to the same universal limitation: “what no one desires or no one can do” (TTP 16.4).4  
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Not only are all fish constrained to inhabit water and big fish blamelessly eat little fish, but as 
Spinoza relates: “There is in Nature no individual thing that is not surpassed in strength and 
power by some other thing…by which the said thing can be destroyed” (E 4.ax. 105), i.e., there is 
always a bigger fish.  The logic of the conatus-driven striving in the state of nature culminates in 
Spinoza’s striking claim that “the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power 
extends” (TTP 16.2), or in other words “the natural right of every individual is coextensive with 
its power” (TP 2.4).   
Does this mean that in the state of nature (and by extension democracy) might makes right, so 
that if a being can physically do something, it must have a concurrent moral right to do it?  The 
answer appears to be that in principle might or power does indeed constitute the natural basis 
of right insofar as Spinoza does not identify any other external principle of natural justice to 
control or even justify actions.  Equality then is problematic in Spinoza’s state of nature because 
so little actual power, and thus right, does the individual have relative to the rest of nature that 
Spinoza admits “as long as human natural right is determined by the power of each single 
individual and is possessed by each alone, it is of no account and is notional rather than factual” 
(TP 2.15).  Spinoza concludes that human beings are “by nature enemies” (TP 2.14) because of 
this relative equality, which makes all individuals competitors for survival. 
The naturalness of democracy is thus in one sense simply a logical deduction from the natural 
right that lies at the foundation of every state.  Democracy is natural insofar as it rests on the 
simple but compelling logic that majorities have the power, and thus the right to compel 
obedience from minorities (Matheron 1985: 168; Smith 1997: 133, 136).  Compared to other 
regimes built on anything less than a popular foundation, democracy theoretically at least 
produces a greater capacity to secure the preservation of individuals by collecting their power as 
a multitude.  As Spinoza reasons: “The greater the number of men who thus unite into one 
body, the more right they will all collectively possess” (TP 2.15, 2.13; cf. McShea 1968: 82).  The 
naturalness of democracy is then demonstrable in an inverse relation to the state of nature as 
individual right means very little in the totality of nature, but acquires greater salience literally 
with the size of the collectivity to which the individual is united. 
Here Spinoza seems to admit that the superiority of democracy is based at least partly on the 
premise that the individual in a democracy has very little power or right compared to the 
collectivity.  However, could the claim that right is coextensive with power not also easily justify 
the rule of a heavily armed minority or “enforcement cadre” (Curley 1996: 326; contra 
Matheron 1985:176)?  Or as Gatens observes, “if ‘right’ and ‘power’ are coextensive, what, if 
anything, can justify the normative claim that a community of rational beings is superior to a 
tyrannical state?” (Gatens 2009: 190).  At the very least, it is not clear solely on the basis of 
Spinoza’s treatment of the state of nature why non-democratic regimes would not satisfy the 
requirements of rightful rule, if they can secure obedience and support. 
Nature is also, of course, the central concept in Spinoza’s metaphysics.  In fact, Spinoza 
highlights the metaphysical assumptions underlying his state of nature account quite explicitly 
when he claims: “the power of nature is the very power of God who has supreme right to all 
things” (TTP 16.2).  In the Ethics, Spinoza’s doctrine of substance identified God with the unity of 
substance “consisting of infinite attributes” such that “nature” or God amounts to the totality of 
all things in the world of which every particular is simply a mode of universal and eternal 
substance (E1.def6.4; E1.P33s2.22-23).  The salient features of Spinoza’s idea of substance are 
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that it is indivisible, solitary and expresses “eternal and infinite essence,” which “necessarily 
exists” (E1.P5, 8, 11-13).  In other words, the central thrust of Spinoza’s account of substance is 
that his metaphysics, similar at least formally to monotheistic religion, forecloses the possibility 
of multiple substances. 
At first glance, the philosophical monism animating Spinoza’s metaphysics seems to be the very 
opposite of what he associates with democracy; namely, its capacity to imitate the state of 
nature by harnessing the power of diverse human types, each with “the sovereign right to do 
everything it can do” (TTP 16.2; Rosen 1987: 467).  However, Spinoza’s account of substance 
does not eliminate diversity so much as it points to deeper complexity in nature than a specious 
version of diversity recognizes.  Underlying the formal unity of substance is the principle of a 
necessary connection among infinity of distinct singularities.  As Balibar observes, the infinity of 
attributes including both physical things and ideas means that substance is not “la négation 
d’une pluralité” (Balibar 1990: 73).  The essential interiority of conatus-driven individuals in the 
state of nature would thus be intelligible as modes of the “infinite attributes” of substance 
(E1def6).  Substance is then not an all encompassing and homogenizing form, but rather it is a 
dynamic power or as Balibar once more puts it, a “cause productrice” (Balibar 1990: 71, also 
Smith 2003: 32).  As a concept signifying both the material reality of being and the productive 
forces of becoming, Spinoza’s idea of substance clearly attempts to integrate unity and diversity 
in the totality of God and nature. 
 Spinoza insists that democracy is uniquely natural among political possibilities because the idea 
of infinity characterizing his theory of substance finds its political manifestation in the 
democratic principle of universality.  Insofar as God is “the universal power of the whole of 
nature” that brings “all individual things together,” then democracy is the most God-like or 
natural regime for it alone can be “defined as a united gathering of people which collectively has 
the sovereign right to all it has the power to do” (TTP 16.8).  As the greatest collected power of 
individuals, democracy would then be the best translation in political terms of the central 
metaphysical claim embodied by Spinoza’s concept of God.  This emphasis on democratic 
inclusiveness is, however, qualified by Spinoza’s truncated account of democracy in the 
unfinished eleventh chapter of the posthumously published Political Treatise in which he seems 
to suggest that democracy could have a more restricted franchise than aristocracy (TP 11.2).  
While sadly Spinoza left this commentary on excessive democratic legal formalism unexplained, 
we can at least surmise that he did not mean to suggest that the legal basis of citizenship was 
the essence of democracy for as Spinoza observes elsewhere about democracy: “That sovereign 
power is bound by no law” (TTP16.8). 
Indeed, the more important implications of Spinoza’s metaphysics as it relates to democracy 
appear to be two-fold.  First, if democracy is the most natural regime, then it is also in Spinoza’s 
terms the most unstable government.  Or more positively, democracy is the form of government 
most reflective of the fluid dynamic of change in power relations caused by natural right.  As we 
know from the Ethics, Spinoza did not view fluidity as debilitating instability because complex 
bodies require change in order to preserve their essence.  The unity of complex bodies, 
including political society, presupposes individual parts that “preserve an unvarying relation of 
movement among themselves” (E2.P13def).  The capacity to adjust to changing conditions, 
while preserving a degree of internal cohesion, would then seem to be one of the defining 
characteristics of a successful polity.  Second, there is the problem of individuation.  Even 
allowing for infinite diverse attributes of substance, how much does the finite individual really 
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matter if in the grand scheme of Spinoza’s metaphysics they are all merely modes of a singular 
substance?  The problem can be restated that insofar as democracy stands as Spinoza’s closest 
approximation of the state of nature, then the status of individual rights, as a subset of natural 
right, appears more precarious in democracy than in any other regime for in democracy the 
inverse relation of the natural power of the individual to the power of government is most 
acute.  Democratic government is naturally powerful precisely because the practically negligible 
natural right of individuals in the state of nature is somehow pooled to produce a genuinely 
effectual form of power.  Understood solely in terms of its resemblance to the overarching 
metaphysical principle of substantial unity, democracy thus appears to threaten the virtual 
disappearance of the individual into much larger social forces. 
The Reasonableness of Democracy 
The crucial corollary to Spinoza’s argument for the naturalness of democracy is his claim that it 
is also the most rational form of government.  In this respect, he dramatically departs from the 
venerable tradition of philosophical anti-democrats dating back to Plato.  Our task, however, is 
complicated by the need to make sense of the theoretical implications of this argument in light 
of Spinoza’s contention that the state of nature is a condition dominated by passion not reason.  
How then can democracy be at once the most natural and the most rational regime? 
We should begin by recognizing that Spinoza calls democracy the most rational government in 
two different senses.  First, he extrapolates from the natural right to self-preservation that a 
majority in any society is rational in the sense that it would never seek to harm itself (Spinoza 
2000: 6.3).  This is analogous to the classical republican argument, which contrasts the public 
virtue of the citizen with the corruption of self-interested courtiers.5
Spinoza’s radical claim is that democracies have the capacity to control human appetites and 
desires by bringing individuals within the “limits of reason, so that they may dwell in peace and 
harmony” (TTP 16.9).  The inherent rationality of democracy thus reduces on one level to an 
empirical question for Spinoza assumes that a large group of people can only unite around laws 
that are based on sound reason (TP 2.21, 3.7).  This theoretical imperative toward inclusiveness 
allows for the creation of stable rational consensus that filters out extremes; that is to say, 
reason serves as a unifying force in democratic society.  But upon what specific rational 
conclusions does Spinoza expect a democratic people to unite? 
  Yet the historical charge 
against democracy from philosophers was never really about the motives of the people, but 
rather about popular ignorance and intemperance.  Thus, the second and more controversial 
claim Spinoza makes for democracy is that irrational ideas are unlikely to filter through the 
popular legislative process:  “For it is almost impossible that the majority of a large assembly 
would agree on the same irrational decision” (TTP 16.9).  This assumes that a common impulse 
or passion will not work through a large group, but given the centrality of the passions in 
Spinoza’s account of conatus, what could give him any confidence about this? 
We must be careful to distinguish between the argument that reason is constitutive of right, 
which Spinoza emphatically rejects for “men are led by blind passion more than by reason” (TP 
2.5; TTP 16.2), and an argument about right that discards any rational standard whatsoever, an 
argument that Spinoza does not make.  Even within the power based logic of Spinoza’s natural 
right theory there is a role for reason to help determine the limits of right; namely, “what no 
one desires or can do” (TTP 16.4).  Thus, while Spinoza’s account of nature precludes any 
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transcendent normative standard, it may be possible, as Curley suggests (1996: 318-22), to 
identify a rather weaker, but by no means negligible, claim for reason’s role in determination of 
right insofar as self-destruction limits right for both the individual and the state bound by the 
“universal rules governing natural things in general and reason in particular” (TP 4.4, italics 
added).  Both the political state and the individual in the state of nature can do wrong, not by 
violating a transcendent moral code, but rather if “it does, or suffers to be done, things that 
cause its downfall” (TP 4.4). 
By insisting that nothing does right when it acts self-destructively, Spinoza indirectly introduces 
into his argument a notion of right that is not simply reducible to power.  Individuals and states 
have the power in the strict sense to do all manner of stupid and self-destructive actions, but in 
doing so they contradict some vital rational element of their own drive for survival.  However, 
Spinoza insists that the political community alters the individual’s relation to questions of right 
for as a relational construct, the state brings many individuals under the rule of reason by their 
complex interaction with the laws (Del Lucchese 2009: 340, 353).  Likewise, when a government 
acts contrary to reason, and thus “falls short of its own self, or does wrong” (TP 4.4), it impacts 
more people than could any private individual.  Democracy, then, would be the most rational 
government if it does one or both of two things.  First, if it brings more individuals under the 
rule of law than any other government.  And second, if it provides the most consistently rational 
policies to secure its citizens. 
Both of these possibilities are complicated by Spinoza’s expressed pessimism about the 
rationality of the multitude.  Can democratic government be rational, if the multitude who are 
the base of its power are not?  Power is not identical to right and, as several commentators have 
observed, Spinoza’s statements about the multitude are hardly encouraging (Smith 1997: 121-
22; Smith 2003: 132-33; Mara 1982: 142).6
It will hardly do to observe that Spinoza can be a committed democrat without being naïve 
about the rational capacities of the multitude (Feuer 1980: 133).  This is undoubtedly true, 
however, the anti-populist sentiments in these passages cannot be dismissed so easily.  The 
more fundamental problem involves making sense of Spinoza’s claim that democracy is both the 
most rational and the most natural regime. It seems that the more Spinoza gives to the natural 
power of reason, the less intelligible his state of nature account becomes for while, on the one 
hand, Spinoza insists à la Hobbes that all human beings are naturally enemies because of the 
primacy of the passions, especially fear, he also endorses the traditional scholastic view of 
natural sociability (TP 2.14-15).  Reason shows “men’s true interest” is to escape the “misery of 
solitary life” for “nothing is more advantageous to man than man” (TTP 16.5 [see also TTP 5.7-
9]; E4.P18s.112).  Reason indicates the way to exit the state of nature through a contract by 
which everyone surrenders their natural freedom and reaches an agreement “to decide 
everything by the sole dictate of reason” (TTP 16.5).  Even if individuals do not naturally desire 
what is to their advantage, they can be brought to see it by “hope for greater good and fear of 
greater loss” (TTP 16.5) supporting the conclusions of reason. 
  Distributed liberally throughout Spinoza’s corpus are 
references to the “capricious mind of the multitude…governed not by reason but by passion 
alone” (TTP 17.4), to the “fairy tale” belief in the reason of the common people (TP 1.5, 6.1), and 
Spinoza’s classic contribution to the anthem of bourgeois distrust toward the masses: “The mob 
is fearsome, if it does not fear” (E4.P54s.129). 
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Spinoza’s argument for natural sociability helps to further clarify his understanding of the 
naturalness of democracy.  The intrinsic reasonableness of democracy means that it is more 
natural than monarchy and aristocracy, but not that it is actually natural.  Democracy is at best 
an approximation of natural right, rather than a “microcosm” of nature per se.  Neither 
democracy nor the state of nature is nature in its totality.  The fact that democracy can never be 
more than an approximation of the forces of nature reminds us that the naturalness of 
democracy is tied to Spinoza’s conception of the immanent causality of social construction; that 
is to say, to the process of collecting powers that is at least formally the exact opposite of the 
state of nature.  His primary theoretical concern is not to explain how the irrational multitude 
can attain sufficient reason to form society.  The passions of fear, hope and his confidence in a 
democratized epistemology by which “everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly 
understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at least in part” (E5.P4s.146) probably 
suffice in this respect.  Rather by insisting that “it is impossible that men should ever utterly 
dissolve” civil order (TP 6.1), Spinoza posits a conception of human reason that undermines any 
effort to present contract in the Hobbesian mode as a legitimating instrument for government 
power, or even simply as an explanatory device to account for the transition from the state of 
nature to civil society.  Democracy can be both the most rational and the most natural form of 
government only on condition that it fully reflects the requirements of human sociability. 
Sovereignty and Democracy 
Among Spinoza’s contemporaries, contract theory and the doctrine of sovereignty were the 
primary conceptual devices through which they sought to explain the legitimacy of government 
and the political obligations of subjects and citizens.  However, while Spinoza employs the 
vocabulary of contractualism and sovereignty in both of his major political writings, he 
systematically denudes these concepts of their conventional meaning.7
Spinoza’s treatment of the origin of government is complicated by the fact that while he initially 
presents a decidedly absolutist reading of contract and sovereignty, he then proceeds almost 
immediately to undermine the practical conditions that make this formal absolutism possible 
(Gildin 1973: 378, Curley 1996: 317, Prokhovnik 2004: 228).  The starting point for this formal 
account is the recognition by a number of individuals of the need to leave the conflict-ridden 
state of nature.  Reason combines with the passions of fear and hope to inform individuals of 
the need to honor their promises and, most importantly, that individuals cannot retain their 
natural right entire (TTP 16.7, TP 3.6). Spinoza presents this act of contracting as a kind of 
transfer of power whereby individuals “transfer all the power they possess to society,” and thus 
effectively surrender to the sovereign their right to be judge of the means of their own self-
defense (TTP 16.7-8, TP 3.3).  Spinoza concludes this formal account of contract with a 
Hobbesian flourish by requiring absolute obedience to the sovereign without any reservation or 
institutional check that would erode the unity of sovereign power (TTP 16.8, 16.21).  Reason 
apparently requires nothing less. 
  Indeed, the central 
point of Spinoza’s treatment of sovereignty and contract is to show their inadequacy as 
explanatory devices for political legitimacy.  It is the concept of democracy that provides the 
basis of Spinoza’s alternative account of political phenomena. 
However, Spinoza’s further reflections on the state includes the admission that while his 
treatment of contract and sovereignty generally conforms to practice, these concepts in many 
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respects “will always remain merely theoretical” (TTP 17.1).  This largely theoretical character 
assumes particular salience when we recall that for Spinoza “the democratic republic” expresses 
the essence of social construction, and thus it is the only form of government that he feels the 
need “to discuss explicitly” in the context of his treatment of contract and sovereignty (TTP 
16.11).  The naturalness of democracy is then in some sense dependent upon a certain 
understanding of the naturalness of consent underlying the construction of any political 
arrangement.  This emphasis on the exemplary status of democracy puts Spinoza’s earlier quasi-
Hobbesian rhetoric in a certain context for it turns out that democracy is the only regime that 
Spinoza believes can practically fulfill Hobbes’ theoretical requirements of absolutism. Anything 
less than a majority in society is unlikely to be capable of securing obedience of the whole 
society in the long-term. 
But does Spinoza’s argument that democracy establishes the most felicitous proportion of rulers 
and ruled not suggest a largely functional or instrumental case for democracy that does not 
depend on a metaphysical argument about nature?  That is, does Spinoza’s account of what we 
have termed social construction really differ from standard seventeenth-century contract theory 
in anything apart from a preference for democratic over monarchical absolutism?  While 
Spinoza shared the common early-modern contractualist concern to root social organization in 
the principle of consent, as opposed to pre-modern notions of classical or theologically inspired 
teleology, he differed from other contractarians in the degree to which Spinoza was prepared to 
refer the legitimacy of political power directly to the current organization of social forces rather 
than a seminal expression of consent that putatively grounds political obligation.  Thus, those 
commentators who believe that Spinoza rejected in any meaningful sense the idea of contract 
are basically correct (e.g. Negri 1981: 109, Matheron 1990: 258, Balibar 1998: 57-8, Israel 2006: 
235).  The naturalness of democracy does not presuppose the existence of a democratic 
community preceding any and every other arrangement.  The latter proposition was the 
typically implicit premise of contractarians such as Hobbes, Grotius and Pufendorf who 
employed contract as a device primarily to explain how equal individuals in the state of nature 
go from naturally democratic conditions to their eventual rightful place in the non-democratic 
sovereign state (Matheron 1990: 259).8
Spinoza’s consideration of the theoretical issues raised by the problems of contractualism 
suggests that his argument for democracy cannot simply be reduced to a functional or 
instrumentalist logic of proportion between rulers and ruled.  This is shown most clearly by his 
effort to challenge the assumption that the transfer of natural right from individuals to the 
sovereign can ever be complete for the transferee never “ceases to be a human being” 
possessing an element of natural freedom (TTP 17.1).  Spinoza herein identifies a basic principle 
of subjectivity or interiority which ensures that regardless of the theoretical pretensions of 
contractual absolutism, no individual can ever fully surrender their “faculty of judgment,” or 
cease to be “master of their own thoughts” (TTP 3.8, 20.4).  This is the meaning of Spinoza’s 
famous claim in Epistle 50 that the main difference between his political theory and that of 
Hobbes is that Spinoza “always preserve[s] natural right intact” (Spinoza 1955: 369).  Thus, any 
rigorous natural rights theory must limit the extent of obligation that contract can produce.  For 
instance, promise breaking is, contra Hobbes, a matter of right for Spinoza, if the violation of 
  Spinoza rather presents democracy as an activity of 
social construction in which “all remain equal as they had been previously in the state of nature” 
(TTP 16.11).  The dynamic character of democracy means that it can never be reduced to simply 
a transitional stage in the contractual process, nor even set apart as a logically necessary first 
principle of practical reason.   
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trust serves a rational purpose such as self-preservation (TTP 16.6).9
Spinoza’s idea of democracy involves the practical recognition that every government is “at 
greater risk from its own citizens…than from its [external] enemies” (TTP 17.1).  In democracy, 
no individual “transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are not thereafter 
consulted but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they are a part” (TTP 16.11).  
It is the centrality of consultation rather than consent, a process of communication rather than a 
single constitutive expression of intent that appears to distinguish democracy from every other 
political arrangement.  However, democracy also emerges as the fullest expression, or even 
theoretical perfection, of the immanent principles of every stable regime for in democracy the 
permanent communicative relation of rulers and ruled is part of “the explicit mode of operation 
of the political system” (Walther 1993: 55).  It is not surprising then that, with this democratic 
principle of consultation as a model, in his comparative regime analysis in the Political Treatise 
Spinoza makes the incorporation of consultative principles into monarchy and aristocracy, that 
is to say their democratization, practically the sole basis for their improvement (TP chs. 6-10; 
Balibar 1998: 72-74). 
  Spinoza’s association of 
reason with the common good, on the one hand, and violence with particular interests, on the 
other, supplies the context for his remarkable claim that “no one has maintained a violent 
government for long” (TTP 16.9).  This argument goes beyond merely making gestures toward 
some expression of consent being necessary to found legitimate governments.  Rather Spinoza’s 
aim with regard to illuminating the conflict between reason and violence is to make a specific 
point about the nature of democracy.   
If the real test of political success lies in “devising a form of government that was not in greater 
danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes,” then the key to establishing a durable 
state “depends chiefly upon the loyalty of its subjects” (TTP 17.4, 17.2).  Indeed, one important 
aim of Spinoza’s extended discussion of the biblical Hebrew Republic in chapters 17 and 18 of 
the Theologico-Political Treatise is to demonstrate the ways in which the Mosaic regime 
succeeded and failed in securing the loyalty of the people.  By replacing obedience with loyalty 
as the prime political imperative, Spinoza reinforces the central role of human subjectivity and 
psychological interiority in his naturalistic account of the state: “Obedience is less a question of 
an external than an internal action of mind.  Hence he is most under the dominion of another 
who resolves to obey every order of another wholeheartedly” (TTP 17.2).  To the extent that a 
meaningful consultative, and perhaps even electoral, process is required to secure this loyalty, 
then for Spinoza democracy reflects a flesh and blood political truth, which can never be 
reduced to the formal abstractions of contract and sovereignty doctrine. 
There are two principal conclusions that we can draw from Spinoza’s account of sovereignty and 
contract.  First, while Spinoza retains some rhetorical features of contract theory, the tension 
between the formal unity of power expressed in sovereignty and the actuality of power 
relations due to the natural force of society is, according to Spinoza, irresolvable within the 
theoretical terms of contractualism.  Thus the state of nature remains a feature of political life 
not as the vestige of pre-civil individual rights, but rather as a concrete manifestation of the 
irreducible subjectivity in human psychology: “Everyone who does not have the use of reason 
lives in a state of nature” (TTP 16.19).  Second, for Spinoza the concept of democracy reflects 
both existing power relations and the constantly unfolding process of change underlying any 
formal political arrangement.  Indeed, Spinoza goes so far as to claim that the “foundations of 
the other forms of government” are “clear enough” from what we know about democracy (TTP 
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16.11).  This statement begs the question however, in what way does knowledge about the 
causality immanent in democracy provide insights about non-democratic government and even 
about political life per se?  
Once again, the connection between Spinoza’s political theory and his metaphysics is 
illuminating.  The dual character of Spinoza’s treatment of nature extending to the doctrine of 
substance, on the one hand, and the doctrine of natural right, on the other, provides the 
theoretical connection between the political and the more speculative aspects of Spinoza’s 
philosophy.  This is not, of course, to suggest that Spinoza viewed democracy as a direct 
translation of metaphysical principles into the political realm.  For Spinoza, political life contains 
far too much contingency to ever allow such conceptual homogeneity.  Moreover, Spinoza 
famously doubted whether it is desirable to project speculative principles into political analysis, 
for “no men are esteemed less fit to direct public affairs than theorists or philosophers” (PT 1.1).  
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this praise for experience as a rejection of any 
connection between metaphysics and political theory. Quite the contrary, Spinoza identifies 
what he takes to be the problem with classical moral philosophy; namely, that it was too 
idealistic because not based on principles deducible from actual human nature.  In what follows, 
we will demonstrate that Spinoza’s idea of democracy is embedded in a theoretical framework 
weaving together metaphysical, ethical and political reflections upon the proper grounds of 
political community and the good life for individuals.   
The Formative Purpose of Democracy 
For Spinoza democracy is a concept encompassing multiple phenomena in relation to the 
rational expression of power; in particular it reflects a principle of equality that operates at both 
the material and psychological level.  On the material level, democracy expresses the equality 
deriving from the calculus of physical power inhering in natural right.  Democracy thus is the 
strongest form of government because it is structurally disposed to collect the greatest mass of 
individual powers into a social force capable of securing loyalty to its rule.  With respect to 
human psychology, it is the government most consistent with the principles of subjectivity and 
individual freedom that simply cannot be surrendered to society. 
The remaining question for our purposes is: Does Spinoza’s account of democracy harmonize 
the two distinct aspects of nature; namely, the communal pressures of weight and number (not 
to mention brute force), on the one hand, and the incipient anarchy of irreducible subjectivity, 
on the other?  We propose that for Spinoza the superiority of democracy lay precisely in its 
formative purpose in the reconciliation of individual development and social good; that is in 
harmonizing the “free state” and the “free man.” 
In order to understand this formative purpose, we need to distinguish the social and individual 
aspects of Spinoza’s idea of democracy.  In terms of social reality, Spinoza presents democracy 
as the perfection of the state because of its capacity to advance the primary goals of the state; 
namely, to promote peace, security, and personal freedom.  Understood simply as a function of 
natural right, democracy is the logical conclusion to the idea of social construction for if each 
individual “has that much less right the more he is exceeded in power by the others 
collectively,” (TP 2.16) then democracy is the strongest government because it produces 
relatively the weakest individuals.  Democracy is both the perfection of collective human power 
and a kind of normative force, for the state seeks to guide all citizens in regard to “what is good, 
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what is bad, what is fair and what is unfair” (TP 4.1).  Spinoza thus presupposes that the reason 
of the individual is in some sense subsumed in the cognitive framework of a democratic 
community, which assumes its own unique form of rationality “arising from magnitude and 
quantity” (Del Lucchese 2009: 347).  From the multiplicity of opinions and interests inherent in 
any organized multitude, Spinoza deduces a certain intellectual force epitomized by democracy. 
However, how can we reconcile Spinoza’s claim that the “true purpose of the state is in fact 
freedom” (TTP 20.6) with his contention that the perfection of the state aims toward molding 
the citizens into “one mind” about the “rights of sovereigns” (TP 2.16,4.1)?  Spinoza seems to 
have seen little difficulty in balancing his theorizing with awareness that human knowledge is so 
contingent that there are serious epistemological limits set on what we can know with any real 
certainty.  Indeed, Spinoza’s treatment of the “divine law” in chapter 4 of the Theological-
Political Treatise aimed precisely to illuminate the contingency of human knowledge.  However, 
while Spinoza recognizes limits on the authority of truth claims as the basis to support religious 
toleration and free scientific inquiry, notably he did not extend these limits to the conclusions 
reached by philosophically informed political theory.  That is to say, Spinoza’s philosophy 
unequivocally endorses democracy as the best regime (Theological-Political Treatise) and 
democratic principles as the best means to improve non-democratic regimes (Political Treatise).  
Thus, Spinoza endorses philosophical partisanship in favor of democracy, or civil freedom more 
generally, despite his skepticism about a host of other truth claims including theological ones. 
Spinoza’s metaphysics helps us to understand how he conceived of the complex relation 
between unity and diversity for he insists that the idea of body presupposes internal diversity of 
bodies differentiated by virtue of variable motions, rather than in respect of substance.  All of 
nature is one individual whose parts “vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual 
as a whole” (E1.P13s).  By “without any change” Spinoza means without detracting its totality.  
He emphatically does not mean that unity of body requires a lack of variation among the 
composite parts of a body.  When we apply this aspect of the doctrine of substance to political 
terms, it is apparent that for Spinoza the achievement of “one mind” is admittedly a social or 
political ideal.  But it is an ideal of unity that presupposes internal diversity with respect to 
multiple forms of power, the most important of which are the diversity of distinct physical 
entities striving for preservation and the intellectual diversity of beings whose thoughts are as 
much an expression of their power as is physical force (Matheron 1985: 168).  
Spinoza assumes that the state cannot represent one mind unless “its laws are such as 
prescribed by reason” (TP 2.12, 3.7).  Democracy is the best state precisely because the unity of 
its social power is “founded on and guided by reason” (TP 5.1).  In democracy the individual 
participates in this unity not simply due to the coercive power of the state, but rather primarily 
because the perfected state encourages a way of life characterized “by reason, the true virtue 
and life of the mind” (TP 5.5).  The epistemic and cognitive basis for this unity lies in Spinoza’s 
assumption about the universalizing properties of reason; namely, that “passive emotions” are 
different in nature and contrary to one another, but “insofar as men live under the guidance of 
reason… they always necessarily agree in nature” (E4.P35.118).  The “very nature of reason” 
makes it apparent that “men’s highest good is common to all” (E4.P36s.120), and thus the 
intellectual foundations of the state establish a transcendent standard of unity.   Needless to 
say, this singlemindedness is only fully achievable in a democratic government in which “the 
safety of the whole people” is supreme law, and thus every individual can rationally submit to its 
rule without prejudice (TTP 16.10). Spinoza assumes that majority rule is a reasonable 
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simulacrum of unanimity because it is government by a “majority of the whole of which each 
individual is a part” (TTP 20.14, 16.11).  His conception of reason thus narrows the theoretical 
criteria of the state, even as it facilitates expansion of its popular foundation.  
For Spinoza, democratic unity is an intellectual ideal intersecting individual subjectivity and 
massive social forces.  Spinoza clearly recognizes that democratic governments, perhaps more 
than any other regime, have the right (i.e., power) to oppress individuals and use violence to 
secure peace.  Spinoza’s fundamental insight about democracy, however, extends beyond 
empirical observations about its utility, and points rather to the rational sense of right as a 
function of subjective freedom or autonomy.  As he claims: “Everyone by supreme right of 
nature remains master of their own thoughts” (TTP 20.4).  This is, of course, Spinoza’s primary 
argument for religious toleration, perhaps the most controversial aspect of the debate about 
freedom of thought in his time.  An examination of Spinoza’s complex teaching on toleration is 
clearly outside the scope of the current study.10
Democracy and Happiness 
  However, for our purposes it is important to 
observe the connection between democracy and the culture of freedom Spinoza associates with 
the “supreme right of nature.”  This connection is expressed in both a public commitment to 
intellectual freedom (especially on religious and scientific matters), as well as the 
institutionalization of popular consultative processes that incorporate the principle of rational 
freedom into the direction of the state.  
Spinoza understands the naturalness of democracy at least partly in terms of irreducible 
subjectivity in human nature.  The political implications of this naturalism emerge most clearly in 
relation to the perfection of the state, which is itself a natural phenomenon only insofar as it 
embodies the principles of democracy.  However, how did Spinoza believe that democracy, or 
for that matter any political arrangement, impacts the moral and intellectual development of 
individuals? That is to say, is there is a political, and specifically a democratic, component to the 
achievement of human happiness? 
Once more, it is in the context of his metaphysics that the intellectual foundations of human 
freedom, so pivotal to Spinoza’s democratic politics, are most fully illuminated.  As is well 
known, “freedom” and “blessedness” are the two central concepts in Spinoza’s account of virtue 
in the Ethics.  By freedom, Spinoza means primarily a mental condition involving: “the degree 
and nature of its [the mind’s] command over the emotions and in checking and controlling 
them” (E5.pref.143).  Conversely, “human bondage” is an essentially passive intellectual state in 
which individuals are enthralled to their emotions and suffer from the ignorance produced by an 
inadequate understanding of natural causes (E4.pref.103; E4.P2.106).  In his attempt to 
intellectualize the concept of freedom, Spinoza imports morally charged terms with clear 
political resonance such as slavery and bondage into what amounts to a philosophy of mind.  For 
Spinoza, the analog for truncated intellectual development is quite explicitly political slavery.  
This politicization of mind is, however, less apparent in Spinoza’s famous discussion of 
“blessedness” in Part 5 of the Ethics.  Blessedness is the term Spinoza uses to describe the 
condition produced by the “highest conatus of mind,” namely the intellectual love of God 
(E5.P25.154).  In Spinoza’s doctrine of substance the intellectual love of God amounts to a 
dedicated striving for a scientific understanding of nature (E4.P57.130).  The effect of this 
intellectual love of God on the individual is, Spinoza suggests, a conception of happiness: 
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“Blessedness is nothing other than that self-contentment that arises from the intuitive 
knowledge of God” (E4.App.139; E4.P37s1.119).11
Given Spinoza’s emphasis on a heavily intellectualized account of virtue, it is natural to inquire 
what role, if any, democracy plays in individual happiness.  Does the political excellence of the 
best regime have any relation, causal or otherwise, to human excellence per se?  This question 
has generated considerable debate among Spinoza scholars.  Some interpret Spinoza’s view of 
politics as focused almost exclusively on securing peace and order (Gildin 1973: 385; Geismann 
1991; DenUyl 2008: 12, 16; DenUyl 1983: 166-67; Mara 1982: 135-36; Curley 1996: 331).  In this 
view, democracy is essentially no better or worse at promoting human excellence, although it 
does best the less exalted job that politics is meant to do.  For others, Spinoza’s endorsement of 
democracy is connected to his perception that it is the regime that not only best secures peace, 
but also promotes intellectual virtue, and thus most adequately fulfills the true and highest aim 
of political life (Del Lucchese 2009: 342; Rosenthal 2001: 335; Smith 2003: 144; Smith 2005: 14-
17; Kossman 2000: 81; Israel 2004: 26).   What is at stake with this issue is then nothing less than 
determining Spinoza’s ultimate position on the relation between politics and philosophy. 
  The upshot of Spinoza’s account of 
blessedness is that it makes philosophy, or at least modern natural philosophy, the sine qua non 
of human happiness.  It also, however, seems to suggest a radically de-politicized notion of 
virtue associated more with the rigors of scientific research than with moral philosophy.  In this 
sense, individual perfection not only appears to be unrelated to social virtue (that is to say to 
justice), but it also raises serious doubts about human equality.  The happy individual is a 
knower whose perfection depends on faculties and opportunities that may or may not be 
distributed equally among humankind.  As Spinoza opines: “All things excellent are as difficult as 
they are rare” (E5.P42.161). 
There is certainly textual evidence to support the argument that politics has very little to do with 
Spinoza’s idea of happiness and individual perfection.  For instance, when he lists the “three 
principal categories” of human desire as (i) the understanding of things through “their primary 
causes,” (ii) the acquisition of the “habit of virtue” and (iii) to live “securely and in good health,” 
Spinoza states that the attainment of the first two desires “depends chiefly on our own 
capabilities” (TTP 3.5).  Not only does living in peace and security depend primarily on external 
causes that the intellectual desires do not, Spinoza also does not draw any apparent connection 
between the satisfaction of the last desire and the two others.  The impression that political 
society has little to do with promoting intellectual excellence is only confirmed by Spinoza’s 
claim that “absolutely no one can be compelled to be happy by force of law” (TTP 7.22). 
However, there are also important features of Spinoza’s argument that allow for a prominent 
role for the state in promoting individual happiness.  For instance, Spinoza’s account of natural 
sociability contains a strong indication that there is a social dimension to individual 
development.  The aim of every state, he claims, is for individuals “to live securely and 
satisfyingly” (TTP 3.6, italics added).  What precisely does the qualifier “satisfyingly” add to 
Spinoza’s apparent focus on security?  Significantly, it is in the Ethics rather than the political 
writings that Spinoza clarifies the community’s role in promoting human happiness.  Here 
Spinoza reaffirms the intrinsic rationality of social existence in contrast to the theoretical state 
of nature: “The man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives under a 
system of law than in solitude where [he] obeys only himself” (E4.P73.137).  As Genevieve Lloyd 
observes, for Spinoza “individual human powers are realized—and human identities formed—
under conditions of sociability” (Lloyd 1996: 89).  Moreover, the character of the state makes a 
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difference for if a person “dwells among individuals who are in harmony with man’s nature, by 
that very fact his power of [intellectual] activity will be assisted and fostered” (E4.App.139).  
Spinoza draws a further connection between social forces and intellectual development when 
he claims that a community that encourages “humility, repentance, and reverence” allows for 
individuals to “live by the guidance of reason,” and ultimately to “become free men and enjoy 
the life of the blessed” (E4.P54s.129).  While blessedness is clearly a function of personal 
autonomy and intellectual freedom (Smith 2005: 10-11, 13), we can at least conclude that 
Spinoza did not intend to claim that individual development is impervious to the influence of 
social, and even political, forces. 
Spinoza’s most striking expression of the formative role of politics on human character is 
perhaps his reflection that “Men are not born to be citizens, but are made so” (TP 5.2; cf. 
Hobbes 1991: 110).  Spinoza asserts that the state plays an enormous role in the construction of 
the individual’s civic personality, for even if political obedience is a result of “the internal action 
of mind,” he hastens to add that “minds too are to some degree subject to the sovereign power, 
which has various ways to ensure that a very large part of the people believes, loves, hates, etc., 
what the sovereign wants them to” (TTP 17.2).  The state can influence, and even subject, a 
person’s judgment for good or ill in “almost unbelievable ways” (TTP 20.2).  
Does the superiority of democracy derive from its capacity to assist individual intellectual and 
moral development, in addition to securing peace and unity?  Clearly for Spinoza, peace is not 
primarily an absence of conflict, but rather the virtue coming from “strength of mind,” 
promoted most emphatically and deliberately as the “highest aim” of society in democracy (TP 
5.4).  The “best state” allows individuals to pass their lives in “harmony” with physical security, 
but “especially by reason, the true virtue and life of the mind” (TP 5.5).  In effect what makes 
the “best state” superior is that it allows individuals to live “satisfyingly,” that is to say in a 
“union and harmony of minds” befitting the dignity of a rational creature (TP 6.3, TTP 3.6, 20.6).  
With the advantages of a complex combination of political membership and individual freedom, 
Spinoza proposes that democracy, and the active participation in the life of the state that it 
makes possible for individuals, establishes social conditions that allow reason to develop fully. 
Most significant, however, is the connection Spinoza forms between democracy and peace.  For 
Spinoza peace is a function of rational agreement among people on the basis of intellectual 
premises that command universal assent (TTP 20.6; E4.P35.11).  The root of social conflict is the 
passions or affects.  Insofar as peace is a social condition with specific intellectual requirements, 
and democracy is the “best state” to secure the peace, then Spinoza establishes a link between 
democracy and the intellectual virtue derived from rational self-control and adequate ideas 
about the causes of things.  Democracy thus reflects the social manifestation of an intellectual, 
and perhaps even philosophical, awareness of the political dangers of error, superstition and 
prejudice. Indeed, Spinoza drew these political implications quite explicitly from his metaphysics 
when he claimed that among the many benefits flowing from his philosophy of mind is “that it 
teaches the manner in which citizens should be governed and led; namely, not so as to be 
slaves, but so as to do freely what is best” (E2.P49s.60).  Insofar as Spinoza indicates that some 
measure of philosophy contributes to the achievement of the primary goal of political society, 
then the superiority of the best regime appears inseparable from the relation of philosophy and 
politics. 
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It is thus not surprising that the connection between the two elements of the formative purpose 
of democracy, that is social construction, on the one hand, and individual development, on the 
other, culminates in the freedom to philosophize.  Near the conclusion of the Theological-
Political Treatise Spinoza imposes another crucial criterion for political excellence, which is that 
“the best state accords everyone the same liberty to philosophize” (TTP 20.9).  He thus explicitly 
connects the superiority of democracy to a certain kind of freedom to pursue the highest human 
activity; namely, philosophy (Mara 1982: 135-36, Rosen 1987: 460).  This is the most complete 
sense in which “the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom” (TTP 20.6).  Spinoza applauds 
the freedom to philosophize at least partly on the utilitarian grounds that the benefits of free 
speech and free-thinking outweigh any disadvantages, especially as freedom to philosophize 
contributes to the “advancement of the arts and sciences” (TTP 20.10).  However, he concludes 
that “liberty of judgment” is both “without question a virtue and cannot be suppressed” 
anyways (TTP 20.10).  In a crucial sense, Spinoza’s political naturalism depends on philosophy, 
an activity that is impossible in the state of nature prior to the establishment of law to control 
human passions.  Yet democracy is, of all governments, the most open to philosophy precisely 
because it is the form of government most like the state of nature with respect to a climate of 
freedom and untrammeled individual subjectivity.  In essence, the superiority of democracy 
derives from the fact that it is the only regime that makes the freedom to philosophize an 
essential condition for the construction of society. 
The formation of “one mind” aimed at by democratic society does not mean that Spinoza 
envisioned mass philosophizing.  It more properly demonstrates that the perfection of the state 
presupposes fundamental societal agreement about the importance of intellectual freedom.  
This is a vision of society in which philosophy will likely never be central to the lives of more than 
a few, even as it remains present to all through the intellectual freedom associated with 
religious toleration and advances in the arts and sciences.  However, to Spinoza free expression 
and civil liberty are not primarily matters reserved for guardian institutions designed to protect 
individual rights against overweening majorities.  Indeed, one of the remarkable features of 
Spinoza’s account of democracy is the extent to which it presupposes that the individual 
freedom to philosophize can be incorporated into a broader societal commitment respecting 
the natural basis of individual mental interiority and freedom.  Thus while individual happiness is 
clearly not reducible to social existence (contra Montag 1999: 63; Balibar 1998: 125; and Del 
Lucchese 2009: 352)—democratic or otherwise—Spinoza does posit the basis for a distinct 
causal relation between democracy and philosophy.  Spinoza’s democratic society is thus 
defined in part by its unique capacity to fulfill the task of generating mass public support for the 
recurring reexamination of the nature of this relation. 
Conclusion 
This study has tried to demonstrate that Spinoza understood the naturalness of democracy to lie 
in its properties as a principle of social construction, rather than simply its instrumental value for 
the achievement of extrinsic goods such as peace or security.  Democracy’s formative purpose 
involves the embodiment of metaphysical principles informing both sound social order and 
individual intellectual development.  Thus, Spinoza maintained that democracy, uniquely among 
regimes, has as its explicit operating principle the reconciliation of two distinct conceptions of 
freedom, the one primarily a function of physical preservation and the other an intellectual 
striving for knowledge of God and nature.  In the connection between Spinoza’s metaphysics 
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and his political philosophy we see arguably the first modern philosophical effort to extend the 
meaning of democracy well beyond formal institutions of popular sovereignty. 
In the seventeenth-century, Spinoza’s vision of a nascent democratic political culture strove 
confidently to harmonize the demands of civic virtue and the claims of individual autonomy, 
aiming in effect to bridge the gulf between the classical tradition of republicanism and the newly 
emerging liberal political tradition.  Today we are much more inclined than was Spinoza to 
accept the incommensurability between them.  While ever mindful that it would be unfair and 
anachronistic to impose on Spinoza the narrow terms of interpretive debates that were not his 
own, we have tried to show that Spinoza’s reflections on democracy are a rich source of early 
modern theorizing about the relation between individual freedom and democratic 
republicanism.  The liberal tradition most familiar to us bequeathed to the present a suspicion of 
mass democratic politics, as well as a distrust of any political theory that posits a discernible 
moral or intellectual telos to which political society ought to be directed.  Spinoza perhaps 
remains a salutary reminder that many of our assumptions post-1989 about the superiority of 
liberal democracy rest on more expansive claims about the political requirements of human 
flourishing than we typically care to admit. 
Endnotes 
 
1  Spinoza 2007: 16.11, 20.14 (hereafter TTP chapter and section in notes and text). 
2  TTP 16.9, 20.2 and Spinoza 2000: 6.3 (hereafter TP chapter and section in notes and text). 
3  See also Spinoza 2006: Part 4. Proposition 54scholia. Page 129 (hereafter E part, then preface [pref], proposition 
[P], scholia [s], corollary [cor], appendix [App], definition [def] or axiom [ax], and finally page number). 
4  For the central role of conatus in Spinoza’s account of human psychology, see E 3.P6-7.66-67. 
5  For Spinoza’s relation to the classical republican literature, see Blom 1985. 
6  For the contrary view, which emphasizes the centrality of the “multitude” for Spinoza’s politics, see Negri 1981 
and Balibar 1998. 
7  Some commentators point to what they take to be the centrality of contract in TTP and its virtual disappearance 
in the later TP (Prokhovnik 2004: 208, Feuer 1980: 139-40).  However, this overlooks the fact that the crucial 
chapter 4 of TP “Rights of Sovereign Powers” deals quite directly with the idea of contract (e.g. TP 4.6). 
8  For the authoritarian theory of contract, see Tully 1993: 17-18, 24.   
9  For more on the complex relation between Spinoza and Hobbes, see James 2009: 215-24. 
10  For an in depth analysis of Spinoza on toleration, see Rosenthal 2001 and Balibar 1998: 25-31. 
11  Of the three kinds of knowledge Spinoza identifies at E2.P40s2.51, that is “imagination,” “reason,” and 
“intuition,” blessedness or the intellectual love of God is primarily related to the last of these.  
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